ECJ 10 March 2011, case C-109/09 (Deutsche Lufthansa AG – v – Gertraud Kumpan), Fixed-term work

Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of “a close objective connection with a previous employment contract of indefinite duration concluded with the same employer” in Paragraph 14(3) TzBfG must also be applied to situations in which a fixed-term contract has not been preceded less than six months previously by an indefinite contract, where the initial employment relationship continued for the same activity by means of an uninterrupted succession of fixedterm contracts.

ECJ 10 March 2011, case C-109/09 (Deutsche Lufthansa AG – v – Gertraud Kumpan), Fixed-term work

Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of “a close objective connection with a previous employment contract of indefinite duration concluded with the same employer” in Paragraph 14(3) TzBfG must also be applied to situations in which a fixed-term contract has not been preceded less than six months previously by an indefinite contract, where the initial employment relationship continued for the same activity by means of an uninterrupted succession of fixedterm contracts.

ECJ 4 March 2011, case C-258/10 (Nicusor Grigore – v – Regia Nationala a Padurilor Romsilva), Working time

Article 2(1) of the Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that a period during which a forest warden with a contractual eight-hour working day is responsible for supervising a certain area of forest qualifies as “working time” within the meaning of that provision, if the nature and extent of that supervision, combined with his responsibility, require his physical presence at work and if he is at his employer’s disposal during such presence. It is up to the referring court to determine whether this is the case.

The qualification of a period as “working time” does not depend on the availability of lodgings on site if such availability does not imply a requirement to be physically present at the work location. It is up to the referring court to determine whether this is the case.

Article 6 of the Directive precludes, in principle, a situation in which a forest warden, even though his contract stipulates an 8-hour work day and a 40-hour week, is actually forced to work in excess of those limits. It is for the referring court to examine whether this is the case and, if so, whether Romania has exercised its options to derogate from Article 6.

The employer’s obligation to pay salary for periods during which a forest warden is responsible for supervising an area of forest depends solely on domestic law. 

ECJ 4 March 2011, case C-258/10 (Nicusor Grigore – v – Regia Nationala a Padurilor Romsilva), Working time

Article 2(1) of the Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that a period during which a forest warden with a contractual eight-hour working day is responsible for supervising a certain area of forest qualifies as “working time” within the meaning of that provision, if the nature and extent of that supervision, combined with his responsibility, require his physical presence at work and if he is at his employer’s disposal during such presence. It is up to the referring court to determine whether this is the case.

The qualification of a period as “working time” does not depend on the availability of lodgings on site if such availability does not imply a requirement to be physically present at the work location. It is up to the referring court to determine whether this is the case.

Article 6 of the Directive precludes, in principle, a situation in which a forest warden, even though his contract stipulates an 8-hour work day and a 40-hour week, is actually forced to work in excess of those limits. It is for the referring court to examine whether this is the case and, if so, whether Romania has exercised its options to derogate from Article 6.

The employer’s obligation to pay salary for periods during which a forest warden is responsible for supervising an area of forest depends solely on domestic law. 

ECJ 3 March 2011, cases C-235/10 to C-239/20 (David Claes et al – v – Landsbanki Luxembourg SA in liquidation), Collective redundancy

The Directive applies to a termination of the activities of an employer as a result of a judicial decision ordering its dissolution and winding up on grounds of insolvency, even though, in the event of such a termination, national legislation provides for the termination of employment contracts with immediate effect. As long as the employer exists as a legal entity, its duty to consult with the staff’s representatives must be carried out by management or by its liquidator.

ECJ 3 March 2011, cases C-235/10 to C-239/20 (David Claes et al – v – Landsbanki Luxembourg SA in liquidation), Collective redundancy

The Directive applies to a termination of the activities of an employer as a result of a judicial decision ordering its dissolution and winding up on grounds of insolvency, even though, in the event of such a termination, national legislation provides for the termination of employment contracts with immediate effect. As long as the employer exists as a legal entity, its duty to consult with the staff’s representatives must be carried out by management or by its liquidator.

2011/47 Supreme Court upholds law reducing retirement benefits of former communist secret service members (PL)

In 2009 the Polish Parliament amended the law in such a way that the retirement benefits of former members of the communist secret service were reduced. This deprivation of acquired rights was judged to be constitutional and proportionate and, therefore, lawful.

2011/47 Supreme Court upholds law reducing retirement benefits of former communist secret service members (PL)

In 2009 the Polish Parliament amended the law in such a way that the retirement benefits of former members of the communist secret service were reduced. This deprivation of acquired rights was judged to be constitutional and proportionate and, therefore, lawful.

2015/4 Burden of proof in mobbing, dignity and discrimination cases (CR)

The Supreme Court has rejected the distinction that the lower courts previously made between harassment by the employer (‘mobbing’) and violation of the employee’s dignity, for which special burden of proof rules existed until 2010. In addition, the Supreme Court held that an employer may not discriminate against an employee on the grounds of his level of education.

2015/4 Burden of proof in mobbing, dignity and discrimination cases (CR)

The Supreme Court has rejected the distinction that the lower courts previously made between harassment by the employer (‘mobbing’) and violation of the employee’s dignity, for which special burden of proof rules existed until 2010. In addition, the Supreme Court held that an employer may not discriminate against an employee on the grounds of his level of education.