Summary

The mere fact that the legislature and the executive of a Member State are involved in determining judges' remuneration is not, in itself, incompatible with the principle of judicial independence. 

Question

Must the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU, be interpreted as meaning that the principle of judicial independence precludes the legislation of a Member State under which the remuneration of judges is determined, by the legislature and executive of that Member State, by multiplying the base rate for the remuneration of judges and other members of the judiciary by a coefficient corresponding to the category of the judge concerned?

Ruling 

The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU, must be interpreted as meaning that the principle of judicial independence does not preclude the legislation of a Member State under which the remuneration of judges is determined, by the legislative and the executive powers of that Member State, by multiplying the base rate for the remuneration of judges and other members of the judiciary by a coefficient corresponding to the category of the judge concerned, provided that that determination is not arbitrary, but is based on objective, foreseeable, stable and transparent criteria and ensures that judges receive remuneration commensurate with the importance of the duties they perform, taking into account the economic, social and financial situation of that Member State and the average salary in that Member State.